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J^  5  5 


ESTIL^ATING 

TACTICAL  ; 

SITUATIONS 

m 

and 

^^    COMPOSING  FIELD 

ORDERS 

^B- 

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Hog 

er  3. 

i'itoh 

Captain, 

2d  U. 

,  S. 

Cavalry 

Instructor, 

Dept. 

.  of 

Military  Art 

This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below 


i^Mc  2  5  1359 

APR  16 1959 


IT 
167 


-^^to^=£leld_orderi 


Southern  Branch 
of  the 

University  of  California 


Estimating  Tactical  Situations 

and 

Composing  Field  Orders 


Roger  S.  Fitch 

Captain,  2d  U.  S.  Cavalry 

Instructor,  Dept.  of  Military  Art 


Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas, 
1909 

82624 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Arcliive 

in  2007  witli  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


littp://www.arcli  ive.org/details/estimatingtacticOOfitciala 


t55 
PART  t 


3 


Kstimating  Tactical   Situations 

\^        In  our  service  we  have  come  to  use  the  term 

^0{  "  Estimate  of  the  Situation  "  to  express  that  logical 

process  of  thought  which,    applied  to    a  concrete 

tactical  problem,  enables  one  to  arrive  at  a  definite 

tactical  dicision.     An  estimate  of  the  situation  is 

■^  valueless  unless  it  reaches  its  logical  termination  in 

\  a  decision  upon  a  suitable  plan  of  action.      Similarly 

the  decision  is  of  little  value  unless  conveyed,  in  the 

form  of    appropriate    orders,    to    the    subordinates 

charged  with  its  execution. 

>0n  this  subject  our  proposed  Field  Service  Regu- 
lations state: 
"^  "To  frame  a  suitable  field  order,  the  commander 

SJ  must  make  an  estimate  of  the  situation,  culminating 
"jj  in  a  decision  upon  a  definite  plan  of  action.     He  must 
then  actually  draft  or  word  the  orders  which  will 
carry  his  decision  into  effect. 

"An  estimate  of  the  situation  involves  a  careful 
consideration,  from  the  commander's  viewpoint,  of 
all  the  circumstances  affecting  the  particular  problem. 
In  making  this  estimate,  he  considers  his  mission  as 
set  forth  in  the  orders  or  instructions  under  which 
he  is  acting,  or  as  deduced  by  him  from  his  knowledge 
of  the  situation,  all  available  information  of  the 
1 


— 2— 

enemy  (strength,  position,  movements,  probable  in- 
tentions, etc.),  conditions  affecting  his  onm  command 
(strength,  position,  supporting  troops,  etc.),  and  the 
terrain  in  so  far  as  it  affects  the  particular  situation; 
he  then  compares  the  various  plans  of  action  open  to 
him  and  decides  upon  that  plan  which  will  best 
enable  him  to  accomplish  his  mission." 

MISSION 

In  estimating  a  tactical  situation  the  first  thing 
for  a  commander  to  do  is  to  consider  well  his  mission. 

When  a  command  is  acting  merely  as  an  integral 
part  of  a  larger  command,  its  mission  is  ordinarily 
determined  for  it  by  higher  authority.  In  the  case, 
however,  of  a  practically  independent  command,  or 
in  any  case  where  a  force  is  acting  under  instructions 
of  a  discretionary  nature,  the  commander  will  ordi- 
narily have  to  deduce  his  mission  from  his  knowledge 
of  the  general  situation,  his  acquaintance  with  the 
intentions  or  desires  of  the  superior  who  sent  him 
forth,  and  his  appreciation  of  the  existing  military 
situation. 

Although  each  situ'ktion  influences  the  mission 
and  conduct  of  an  independent  leader  in  quite  a  dif- 
ferent manner  4;han  it  would  if  his  command  were 
directly  dependent  upon  another  and  he  himself 
merely  obeying  precise  and  definite  orders  susceptible 
of  but  one  interpretation,  yet  in  the  one  case,  no  less 
than  in  the  other,  the  general  purpose  of  the  supreme 
commander  must  always  be  borne  in  mind.  The 
means,  however,  by  which  the  general  purpose  may 
best  be  furthered  will  differ  greatly.  As  General 
von  Verdy  says:  "The  officer  who  suddenly  en- 
counters the  enemy  while  patroling  with  his  platoon 
must  conduct  his  actions  from  a  different  point  of 
view  than  if  he  commanded  his  platoon  as  skirmishers^^ 
in  front  of  his  company.    A  division  in  an  army  coi;j»s 


-3— 

will  generally  be  so  situated  that  it  must  carry  out 
an  action,  ^ven  though  it  be  completely  annihilated 
in  so  doing,  and  then  it  would  still  be  promoting  the 
general  purpose;  on  the  other  hand,  a  division  widely 
separated  from  an  army  would,  as  a  rule,  utterly  fail 
to  accomplish  its  mission  if  it  allowed  itself  to  be  an- 
nihilated.'" 

Considering  the  case  of  an  independent  com- 
mander in  the  field,  it  is  evident  that  he  should 
always  bear  in  mind  the  mission  upon  which  he  was 
sent  forth.  In  order,  however,  to  accomplish  this, 
his  original  mission,  he  will  frequently  have  to  adopt 
temporarily  another  mission. 

For  example.  Colonel  A's  regiment  of  infantry  is 
sent  from  the  west  with  orders  to  destroy  the  Mis- 
souri river  bridges  at  Leavenworth  and  Fort  Leaven- 
worth in  order  to  prevent  an  Eastern  brigade  from 
crossing  the  river  and  advancing  westward.  Upon 
approaching  Frenchman,  Colonel  A  learns  that  four 
or  five  companies  of  hostile  infantry  have  crossed  to 
the  west  side  of  the  river  and  have  taken  up  a  posi- 
tion on  the  line  Atchison  hill  — Government  hill,  with 
detachments  at  each  of  the  Missouri  river  bridges; 
but  that  the  rest  of  their  brigade  cannot  arrive  for 
some  hours.  It  is  apparent  that  Colonel  A  can  now 
have  no  hope  of  accomplishing  his  original  mission 
unless  he  first  defeats  and  disperses  the  hostile 
troops  in  his  immediate  front.  His  general  mission 
remains  unchanged,  but  in  view  of  the  recent  devel- 
opments his  immediate  mission  is  to  make  a  success- 
ful attack  upon  the  force  that  blocks  his  advance, 
and  thus  clear  the  way  for  the  accomplishment  of 
his  general  mission. 

In  some  cases  circumstances  arise  which  will 
make  impossible  the  accomplishment  of  the  original 

1  "Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops"— Von  Verdy  du 
Vernois. 


-4— 

mission,  but  will  still  afford  the  commander  an  op- 
portunity to  further  his  superior's  general  plans. 

For  example,  let  us  assume  that  Colonel  A  was 
sent  out  upon  the  same  mission  as  before,  but  that, 
by  the  time  he  reaehes  Frenchman,  he  learns  that 
practically  the  entire  hostile  brigade  has  already 
crossed  to  the  west  side  of  the  river  and  is  advancing 
westward.  General  A's  original  mission  was  in  this 
case  the  same  as  before,  i.e.,  to  destroy  the  bridges 
and  thus  prevent  the  enemy  from  crossing  the  river 
and  advancing  westward.  Colonel  A,  however,  has 
arrived  too  late  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  crossing 
the  Missouri  and  is  too  weak  to  prevent  the  enemy 
from  advancing  westward  if  he  so  chooses.  Colonel 
A  can,  however,  delay  the  enemy's  advance  in  that 
direction.  As  this  'apparently  is  the  only  way  in 
which  he  can  further  the  general  intentions  of  his 
chief,  Colonel  A's  present  mission  is  to  delay  the 
enemy's  westward  advance  by  such  means  as  are  in 
his  power,  e.g.,  by  destroying  the  bridges  over  Salt 
creek  and  elsewhere,  by  fighing  rear  guard  actions, 
etc. 

It  sometimes  happens  that,  by  reason  of  un- 
expected developments,  the  original  mission  must  be 
totally  disregarded  and  a  very  different  one  adopted. 
For  example,  let  us  assume  the  following: 

A  Blue  divsion  in  camp  south  of  Leavenworth 
has  sent  out  a  regiment  of  infantry  with  orders  to 
proceed  northward  to  Kickapoo  and  destroy  certain 
Red  supplies  reported  to  be  stored  there.  The  regi- 
ment moves  out  as  ordered,  but  upon  reaching  the 
vicinity  of  17,  its  colonel  receives  reliable  information 
that  a  brigade  of  hostile  infantry  is  advancing  east- 
ward on  the  Atchison  Pike  and  is  at  this  time  near  K; 
also  that  Kickapoo  is  occupied  by  a  strong  force  of 
the  enemy.  Under  the  circumstances  it  is  apparent 
that  an  attempt  to  carry  out  the  original  mission  of 


-5  - 

the  command  would  be  suicidal.  Only  by  prompt  re- 
treat can  the  regiment  be  saved.  The  commander's 
present  mission  is  therefore  to  withdraw  toward  his 
division  as  promptly  as  possible  and  avoid  being  cut 
off  by  the  enemy. 

As  a  commander's  true  mission  should  he  the 
guiding  star  of  all  his  ordered  movements,  it  is  plain 
that  he,  especially  if  acting  independently,  cannot  be 
too  careful  in  interpreting  his  orders  aright  and  in 
acting  in  such  away  as  will  best  further  the  interests 
of  his  superior  commanders. 

Having  determined  upon  what  constitutes  his 
true  mission,  the  commander  should  then  consider 
the  various  factors  that  influence  his  chances  of  ac- 
complishing it.  These  may  be  considered  in  what- 
ever sequence  seems  best  suited  to  the  particular 
situation.  In  some  cases  there  may  be  no  necessity 
for  considering  all  the  factors  enumerated  in  our 
(F.S.R.)  definition  of  an  estimate  of  the  situation;  in 
other  cases  time  may  be  lacking  for  full  and  complete 
consideration. 

In  this  discussion,  however,  the  various  factors 
that  ordinarily  may  be  expected  to  influence  tactical 
situations  will  for  convenience  be  taken  up  in  detail 
and  in  the  sequence  in  which  they  a])pear  in  the 
definition  referred  to  above. 

THE  ENEMY 

Information  in  General.  —Ordinarily  the  informa- 
tion of  the  enemy  will  be  more  or  less  incomplete. 
Only  on  extremely  rare  occasions  will  a  commander 
have  full  and  accurate  knowledge  of  the  enemy's 
strength,  position,  morale,  intentions,  etc.  Occasion- 
ally a  commander  may  have  sufficient  information 
to  enable  him  to  deduce  quite  accurately  the  enemy's 
military  situation,  but  in  most  cases  information  will 
be  entirely  lacking  upon  some  important  points. 


-6— 

Inasmuch  as  information  of  the  enemy  is  ordi- 
narily obtained  from  various  sources,  it  follows  that 
a  commander  must  carefully  weigh  each  bit  of  in- 
formation and  determine  the  degree  of  credibility  to 
be  attached  to  it.  Frequently  this  can  be  done  by 
comparing  doubtful  information  with  reports  from 
sources  known  to  be  reliable.  A  report  which  at  first 
glance  appears  unreliable  or  incredible  may  be  in 
part  so  strongly  corroborated  by  information  from 
other  sources  that  in  the  end  the  entire  report  may 
be  accepted  as  worthy  of  credence. 

The  sources  from  which  the  information  comes 
and  the  character  and  political  tendencies  of  the 
persons  from  whom  it  is  obtained  should  always  be 
considered.  Ordinarily  information  from  higher 
commanders  can  be  accepted  as  reliable,  but  such  is 
not  always  the  case.  Practically  the  only  absolutely 
reliable  information  is  that  obtained  from  the  perso- 
nal observation  of  trained  officers. 

As  stated  in  Buddecke's  work  on  "Tactical  De- 
cisions and  Orders,"  "every  report,  even  when 
received  from  an  undoubtedly  reliable  source,  should 
primarily  be  carefully  scrutinized  as  to  its  correctness, 
since  errors,  inaccuracies,  and  misconceptions  are 
often  brought  out  by  comparison,  and  must  be  cleared 
up;  only  when  that  has  been  done  can  we  begin  to 
build  a  whole  out  of  the  different  details." 

In  considering  the  information  received  concern- 
ing the  enemy,  it  is  usually  well  to  consider  also  what 
information  the  enemy  may  have  received  concerning 
our  forces.  The  attitude  of  the  inhabitants,  whether 
friendly,  neutral  or  hostile,  would  ordinarily  have 
considerable  bearing  upon  both  the  amount  and 
reliability  of  the  information  received  by  commanders 
in  the  field. 

Strength  and  Position.  —In  considering  the  prob- 
able strength  of  the  enemy,  it  should  be  remembered 


—7— 

» 

that  his  forces  are  likely  to  be  over-estimated  by  even 
the  best  intentioned  observers,  and  that  reports  con- 
cerning his  strength,  especially  if  received  from  non- 
military  persons,  should  be  accepted  as  conclusive 
only  after  corroboration  from  other  sources. 

With  reference  to  the  enemy's  present  position, 
it  may  be  quite  definitely  known,  or  it  may  be  de- 
duced from  reliable  reports,  or  it  may  be  largely  a 
matter  of  conjecture.  The  importance  of  accurate 
information  upon  this  subject  varies  with  the  distance 
separating  the  opposing  forces  and  with  their  respec- 
tive missions,  but  in  any  case  it  should  be  given  due 
consideration. 

It  is  important  that  the  positions  of  your  own 
troops  and  those  of  the  enemy  be  determined,  not 
only  with  reference  to  each  other,  but  also  with 
reference  to  the  more  iTnportant  features  of  the  terrain. 

For  example,  let  us  assume  that  you  are  in  com- 
mand of  a  strong  Blue  force  advancing  to  force  the 
crossings  of  a  river  held  by  insignificant  Red  detach- 
ments. Assume  also  that  you  receive  information 
that  strong  reinf  oroements  are  on  the  way  to  support 
the  Red  detachments.  In  such  a  case  it  is  obvious 
that  you  must  consider  not  only  the  actual  reported 
position  of  the  Red  reinforcements,  but  also  the  dis- 
tance from  their  reported  positions  to  the  river,  the 
time  by  which  they  may  reasonably  be  expected  to 
reach  it,  etc.  The  distance  from  your  own  position 
to  the  river  and  the  time  you  can  reasonably  expect 
to  reach  it  should  also  be  considered.  In  case  the  in- 
formation of  the  Red  reinforcements  is  several  hours 
(or  days)  old,  the  distance  that  such  reinfm'cementa 
could  have  marched  in  the  interim  must  be  con- 
sidered. For,  in  the  absence  of  recent  and  definite 
information  of  the  enemy,  you  must  always  credit 
him  with  doing  what  would  best  further  his  own 
interests  and  be  most  disadvantageous  for  you. 


— 8— 

Probable  Intentions. —RsiYing  carefully  balanced 
the  various  reports  received  regarding  the  enemy's 
strength  and  position,  and  having  arrived  at  some 
sort  of  conclusion  concerning  them,  the  commander 
should  next  consider  the  enemy's  probable  intentions. 
Said  the  Duke  of  Wellington:  "The  great  thing  is 
to  know  from  this  side  of  the  hill  what  the  enemy 
is  doing  on  the  other."  The  so-called  fog  of  war 
obscures  the  view  of  the  commander,  but,  so  far  as 
possible,  the  latter  should  carefully  consider  what 
line  of  action  his  adversary  is  most  likely  to  take. 
As  stated  in  Field  Service  Regulations:  "When  re- 
liable information  of  the  enemy  cannot  be  obtained, 
it  is  assumed  that  he  will  act  with  good  judgment." 

A  commander  who  is  fairly  well  acquainted  with 
the  enemy's  strength  and  position  but  unaware  of 
his  intentions,  should  try  to  imagine  himself  in  the 
place  of  his  adversary  and  then  figure  out,  from  the 
latter's  assumed  point  of  view,  what  method  of  ac- 
tion would  seem  most  reasonable  and  natural. 

In  war  the  enemy  will  undoubtedly  make  every 
effort  to  keep  us  from  learning  his  strength,  position, 
intentions  or  the  manner  in  which  he  proposes  to 
carry  out  his  intentions.  The  result  is  that  a  com- 
mander will  rarely  be  able  to  say  to  himself  that  his 
adversary  will  do  exactly  this  or  that  in  exactly  this 
way  or  that  way;  all  that  he  can  ordinarily  do  is  to 
analyze  the  information  received  concerning  his  forces 
and  then  try  to  make  reasonable  deductions  as  to  his 
real  intentions  and  probable  movements. 

When,  however,  the  enemy  is  so  far  distant  that 
contact  with  him  cannot  be  gained  during  the  day, 
it  is  better  to  postpone  your  attempt  to  deduce  his  in- 
tentions until  such  time  as  it  becomes  necessary  for 
you  to  make  a  new  estimate  of  the  situation.  In  the 
meantime  you  may  receive  other  information  that 
will  enable  you  to  make  a  more  correct  estimate  of 


-9— 

the  enemy's  intentions.  It  is  easier  to  form  a  cor- 
rect estimate  by  considering,  from  an  unbiased  point 
of  view,  all  the  information  received  up  to  the  last 
moment  than  it  is  to  change  an  opinion  previously 
formed  on  insufficient  information.  Therefore  avoid 
arriving  at  premature  conclusions. 

The  influence  upon  one's  own  plans  exerted  by 
the  conclusions  formed  concerning  the  enemy's  proba- 
ble intentions  varies  greatly  according  to  the  situa- 
tion. A  commander  shoidd  endeavor  always  to  keep 
the  initiative,  and  this  can  only  be  done  by  acting  ag- 
gressively. In  war  it  is  better  to  lead  than  to  follow 
suit.  A  commander  whose  mission  makes  offensive 
action  desirable  and  whose  force  is  greatly  superior 
to  the  enemy's  clearly  should  not  permit  the  enemy's 
movements  to  change  his  general  plan  of  action.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  dispositions  of  a  commander, 
whose  mission  is  strictly  defensive,  and  whose  force 
is  greatly  inferior  to  the  enemy's,  may  be  consider- 
ably affected  by  the  movements  of  the  enemy.  So 
long  as  possible,  however,  a  commander  should  keep 
the  reins  in  his  own  hands.  His  mission,  and  not  the 
enemy's  movement,  should,  as  long  as  possible,  be 
considered  the  governing  factor. 


OUR  OWN  TROOPS 

A  commander  who  has  a  clear  realization  of  his 
proper  mission,  and  who  has  made  a  careful  analysis 
of  the  information  received  concerning  the  enemy 
and  considered  its  bearing  upon  his  mission,  would 
ordinarily  next  consider  the  conditions  immediately- 
affecting  his  own  troops. 

Strength  and  Position.— T\ie  strength  of  one's 
own  force  as  compared  with  the  actual  or  reported 
strength  of  the  enemy  should  ordinarily  be  consid- 
ered, but  an  apparent  superiority  on  the  part  of  the 


—10- 

enemy  should  not  be  given  undue  weight,  especially 
if  our  mission  demands  aggressive  action. 

The  position  of  our  troops  may  in  some  cases  be 
one  of  the  controlling  factors  in  the  situation  while 
in  others  it  may  be  of  minor  importance.  A  compari- 
son of  our  own  position  with  the  reported  position  of 
the  enemy  is  in  most  cases  not  only  advisable  but 
necessary. 

Supporting  Troops.— It  has  already  been  shown 
that,  if  a  commander  is  acting  beyond  supporting 
distance  from  any  friendly  troops,  his  action  may 
have  to  be  very  different  from  what  it  would  be  if 
support  were  near  at  hand.  A  commander  should 
ordinarily  consider  the  amount  of  real  support  that 
can  be  expected  from  any  supporting  troops.  This 
naturally  involves  a  consideration  of  the  distance  by 
which  he  is  separated  from  them  or  of  the  time  that 
must  elapse  before  they  can  be  of  any  material 
assistance  to  him.  In  case  the  commander  knows 
that  the  enemy  also  has  supporting  troops,  it  is  ad- 
visable to  compare  the  two  supporting  forces  as  re- 
gards their  relative  strength  and  positions  and  their 
respective  distances  from  the  probable  point  of  con- 
tact or  scene  of  combat. 

TERRAIN 

The  terrain  and  its  influence  upon  the  situation 
must  be  given  the  consideration  due  its  importance, 
for  the  nature  of  the  ground— whether  favorable  or 
unfavorable — may  mean  the  difference  between  suc- 
cess and  failure. 

In  considering  the  terrain,  it  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  consider  those  features  that  may  affect  the 
particular  tactical  situation.  For  example,  in  a  situ- 
ation which  necessitates  the  issuance  of  march  orders, 
the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the  various 
routes  available  for  the  march  ordinarily  deserve  the 


-11- 

first  consideration.  In  a  situation  which  necessitates 
the  issuance  of  orders  directing  the  occupation  of  a 
defensive  position,  the  consideration  of  the  size  of 
the  position,  field  of  fire,  strength  of  the  flanks,  cover 
for  troops  in  the  rear,  direction  of  line  of  retreat, 
probable  direction  of  the  enemy's  main  attack,  etc.j 
are  usually  of  supreme  importance.  In  a  situation 
necessitating  an  attack  upon  a  defensive  position,  the 
commander  of  the  attacking  force  would  naturally 
consider  the  position  occupied  by  the  enemy,  natural 
cover  for  the  attacking  troops  in  their  advance, 
whether  the  main  attack  had  best  be  made  against 
the  defender's  right  or  left  flank,  or  whether  it  must 
necessarily  be  made  against  his  front,  and  whether 
there  are  any  obstacles  preventing  free  movement  to 
the  front,  flanks,  or  rear. 

For  example,  in  the  case  of  the  first  tactical  situ- 
ation outlined  under  the  heading  "Mission"  (see 
page  3),  Colonel  A  would  naturany,  in  considering 
the  terrain,  consider  primarily  the  probable  extent  of 
the  enemy's  position,  the  command  of  Government 
and  Atchison  hills  over  the  valley  of  Salt  creek,  the 
protection  afforded  by  Sentinel  hill  to  the  early  part 
of  an  advance  against  the  hostile  right,  the  cover 
afforded  by  the  wood  near  Duffins,  the  cover  to  be 
found  along  the  tributaries  of  Salt  creek,  the  loss  of 
time  that  would  naturally  result  from  a  detour 
through  the  thick  woods  of  Eleven  Hundred  Foot  hill, 
the  dead  spaces  that  might  be  found  near  the  western 
base  of  the  hills  occupied  by  the  enemy,  and,  in  short, 
all  such  features  as  influence  his  decision  upon  the 
Hne  of  advance,  the  point  of  attack,  etc.  He  must 
not  loose  sight  of  the  fact  thut  the  accomplishing  of 
his  general  mission  largely  depends  upon  the  prompt 
defeat  of  the  enemy  in  his  front  and  that  the  ele- 
ments of  time  and  distance  must  be  given  due  weight 
in  determining  his  plan  of  attack. 


-i2- 

in  the  second  situation  (under  the  heading  ''Mis"- 
sion")  Colonel  A  should  consider  primarily  the  ad- 
vantage offered  by  Salt  creek  as  an  obstacle  to  the 
forward  march  of  the  enemy,  the  bridges  over  it  that 
should  be  destroyed,  the  probable  line  of  hostile  ad- 
vance, and  the  positions  available  for  rear  guard 
actions. 

In  the  third  situation  the  colonel  would  naturally 
first  consider  whether  his  best  line  of  retreat  would 
be  southward  via  Frenchman  and  G,  or  via  the  Mill- 
wood road  and  Fort  Leavenworth.  The  advantages 
of  the  latter  route,  especially  if  the  bridge  at  French- 
man can  be  destroyed,  are  apparent,  and  the  shelter- 
ing line  of  hills  along  Sheridan's  drive  will  conceal 
his  movements  after  he  has  left  the  valley  of  Salt 
creek. 

TIME  AND  SPACE 

In  most  esting^tes  the  allied  elements  of  time  and 
space  must  be  ''considered.  These  elements  are 
ordinarily  of  prime  importance  when  it  is  a  question 
of  when  reinforcements  may  be  expected  to  arrive 
for  one  side  or  the  other,  when  there  is  a  time  limit 
within  which  a  certain  operation  must  be  concluded, 
when  it  is  a  question  of  concentrating  scattered 
troops,  or  when  road  spaces  and  rates  of  marching 
have  to  be  considered,  etc.  In  some  cases  the  single 
element  of  time  may  be  the  controlling  factor  and 
affect  the  commander's  decision  to  a  greater  extent 
than  all  other  factors  combined. 

METHODS 

A  commander  who  is  certain  that  his  original 
mission  remains  unchanged  (or  who  recognizes  the 
fact  that,  on  account  of  new  developments,  he  must 
modify  his  original  conception  of  his  mission  or  adopt 
a  new  one)  and  who  has  fully  considered  the  various 


-13- 

factors  that  affect  the  situation,  should  then  compare 
the  various  methods  or  plans  of  action  open  to  him 
for  selection.  In  comparing  the  advantages  and  dis- 
advantages of  the  various  possible  methods  he  should 
always  keep  his  mission  in  mind. 

DECISION 

Having  carefully  weighed  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages  of  the  various  methods  open  to  him, 
the  commander  should  definitely  decide  upon  the  one 
plan  of  action  which  promises  the  best  opportunity  of 
enabling  him  to  accomplish  his  true  mission,  A  com- 
mander's decision  upon  a  single  definite  plan  of  action 
is  therefore  the  culmination  of  his  estimate.  It  is 
the  cap-stone  of  the  structure  which  he  has  built 
upon  and  around  his  mission. 

Buddecke,  after  stating  that  the  marks  of  sound 
tactical  procedure  are  "simplicity  and  a  firm  ad- 
herence" to  the  line  of  action  adopted,  says:  "The 
decision,  once  reached,  must  be  unwaveringly  carried 
out  with  our  whole  energy.  This  condition  is  of  so 
great  importance  in  tactical  affairs  that  the  best 
course  of  action,  if  carried  out  half-heartedly,  will 
come  to  naught,  while  a  mistake  in  the  choice  of 
courses  can  often  be  entirely  offset  by  decided  and 
competent  action." 

As  Griepenkerl  says:  "Arrive  at  a  definite  de- 
cision. *  *  *  I  warn  you  against  half  measures. 
For  example,  if  you  have  decided  to  attack,  do  so 
with  all  your  troops;  if  you  wish  to  retreat,  do  not 
come  to  a  halt  again  after  a  few  miles  without  the 
weightiest  reasons.  Be  perfectly  clear  in  your  own 
mind  what  you  want  to  do  and  then  carry  it  out  to 
the  letter." 


PART   il 
Map  Problems 


GENERAL  REMARKS 

Map  problems  are  primarily  intended  to  assist 
officers  in  gaining-  practical  knowledge  of  tactics  and 
to  develop  their  power  of  decision. 

Gizycki  has  well  said  that  he  who  seeks  to  be- 
come a  leader  of  troops  should  develop  the  following 
qualifications: 

"1.  The  ability  to  reach  a  clear  and  intelligent 
decision. 

"2.  The  ability  to  communicate  this  decision 
clearly  and  unmistakably  to  others. 

"3.  The  necessary  knowledge  to  enable  him  to 
lead  the  troops  so  as  to  carry  out  his  intentions."* 

All  writers  on  tactics  agree  that  these  most  de- 
sirable qualifications  can  best  be  developed  by  con- 
stant practice  in  the  solving  of  concrete  problems, 
necessitating  the  formulation  by  the  student  of  a 
large  number  of  definite  decisions  and  orders.  By  a 
thorough  course  in  such  problems  the  student  will 
acquire  an  ever  increasing  ability  to  form  correct 
tactical  decisions  in  the  field  and  will  eventually  be 
able  to  arrive  at  such  decisions  very  rapidly— in  fact, 
almost  simultaneously. 

In  the  solution  of  map  problems,  it  is  not  suffi- 
cient to  arrive  at  general  conclusions  alone.  To  do 
that  and  no  more  would  be  of  comparatively  little 
value.  The  student  must  in  each  case  try  to  imag- 
ine  himself  in  the  leader's  place,  form  for  himself 

♦Introduction  to  Strategic  Tactical  Exercises,  Gizycki. 
14 


-16- 

a  mental  picture  of  the  terrain  and  of  the  disposi- 
tions of  the  troops,  reckon  correctly  with  reference 
to  time  and  space,  arrive  at  a  clear  and  clean-cut 
decision,  and  embody  his  decision  in  the  form  of  ap- 
propriate field  orders.  Only  by  so  doing  can  he  obtain 
the  maximum  benefit  and  the  rapid  development 
both  of  his  "tactical  sense"  and  of  his  powers  of  de- 
cision. 

As  Litzmann  says:  "A  practical  solution  can 
nearly  always  be  found  by  one  who  has  sufficient 
talent  and  experience  to  see  the  map  plastically  before 
him  and  not  only  to  comprehend  mechanically  the 
information  in  the  problem  concerning  the  strength 
of  both  forces,  but  to  actually  see  the  opposing  par- 
ties with  his  mind's  eye,  and,  as  it  were,  actually 
experience  the  events  portrayed."* 

The  necessary  basis  for  the  solution  of  map  prob- 
lems, consists,  therefore,  in  an  ability  to  read  a  map 
correctly  and  in  a  certain  power  of  imagination. 

The  ability  to  read  a  map  does  not  mean  merely 
that  the  student  "must  be  able  to  understand  the 
meaning  of  all  conventional  signs  and  to  reckon  dis- 
tances, but  also  that  he  must  be  able  to  comprehend 
all  details  so  that  they  form  themselves  into  a  com- 
plete and  harmonious  whole,  and  this  to  such  a  degree 
that  he  actually  feels  the  nature  of  the  terrain  in  the 
map  before  him.  Every  soldier  who  is  at  all  fitted 
for  the  duties  of  leadership  can,  by  practice,  gain 
this  ability,  though  the  time  required  may  be  long  or 
short,  according  to  the  natural  ability  of  the  worker.  "* 

SOLUTION  OF  MAP  PROBLEMS 

In  solving  a  map  problem  the  first  thing  to  do  is 
to  read  the  problem  carefully,  comparing  it  meantime 
with  the  map.    At  this  preliminary  reading  it  is  a 

♦Selected  Division  Problems,  page  284. 


-18- 

good  plan  to  mark  on  the  map,  either  by  means  of 
colored  pinsf  or  pencils,  all  those  places  referred  to 
in  connection  with  our  own  troops  and  those  of  the 

enemy. 

Having  thus  obtained  a  bird's-eye  view  of  the 
situation,  the  problem  should  be  carefully  re-read 
several  times.  The  longer  and  more  difficult  the 
problem,  the  greater  the  care  that  should  be  taken. 

'  'In  tactical  problems  the  forces  on  both  sides 
are,  as  a  usual  thing,  no  more  clearly  indicated  than 
they  would  be  in  maneuvers  or  actual  warfare.  Of 
course  one  has  definite  information  concerning  the 
troops  under  his  own  command,  but  this  is  not  always 
the  case  concerning  friendly  subdivisions;  and  the 
enemy's  forces  are  almost  always  unknown.  In  this 
very  point  lies  'the  uncertainty  of  war  conditions',  a 
very  necessary  part  of  a  good  tactical  problem.  Some- 
times only  'symptoms'  are  given  from  which  conclu- 
sions are  to  be  drawn,  just  as  in  the  case  of  doctor's 
diagnosis:  for  instance— the  sound  of  firing  from  a 
distance  where  there  is  not  supposed  to  be  any  enemy: 
— the  sound  of  battle,  suddenly  ceasing,  although  we 
believed  that  we  still  had  at  least  an  hour  before  our 
time  for  taking  part — the  conduct  of  the  inhabitants 
from  which  the  nearness  of  hostile  forces  can  often 
be  guessed,  etc.  In  reading  a  problem  things  of  this 
sort  are  often  easily  overlooked,  even  though  they  be 
of  supreme  importance.  Therefore,  it  is  important 
to  read  most  carefully. 

"Often  troops  are  seen  at  different  times  and  at 
different  places,  or  are  reported  by  observers  in  dif- 
ferent ways  (so  that)  sometimes  one  may  be  in  doubt 
whether  the  same  troops  or  different  ones  are  meant. 
However,  careful  attention  to  conditions  of  distance 

fThe  round-headed  pins  used  in  the  war  game  are  very- 
convenient  for  this  purpose,  blue  pins  being  used  for  our  own 
forces  and  red  ones  for  hostile  troops. 


—17— 

and  time,  as  well  as  reference  to  the  map  and  the  use 
of  dividers,  will  make  matters  clear."  (Littzmann.) 

The  next  thing  to  do  is  to  consider  the  actual  and 
relative  positions  of  your  own  troops  and  those  of  the 
enemy  and  to  picture  to  yourself  the  actual  appear- 
ance of  the  ground,  especially  such  features  as  may 
affect  the  problem  in  hand.  Get  oriented,  as  it  were, 
upon  the  situation  as  a  whole.  As  Griepenkerl  says, 
"You  must  now  see  the  troops  in  formation  on  the 
terrain  before  you— your  own  troops  as  well  as  the 
enemy's.  The  more  vivid  your  imagination  in  this, 
the  better  will  he  your  tactical  work'\ 

Having  thus,  by  the  aid  of  the  map  and  your 
imagination,  placed  yourself  in  the  place  of  the  com- 
mander, you  should  definitely  determine  what  is  your 
true  mission. 

You  must  then  consider  both  your  own  and  the 
enemy's  troops  as  well  as  the  terrain  with  especial 
reference  to  the  manner  in  which  these  elements  affect 
the  accomplishing  of  your  mission.  In  this  consider- 
ation your  scale  and  dividers  should  be  freely  used. 
If  it  be  a  question  of  marching— either  of  your  own 
troops  or  those  of  the  enemy— you  should  measure 
the  distance  to  important  objectives  and  from  that 
calculate  the  time  required  to  reach  such  points.  If  it 
be  a  question  of  positions  their  frontage  and  depth 
should  he  measured. 

WRITING  AN  ESTIMATE 

If  a  written  "Estimate  of  the  Situation"  is  re- 
quired as  part  of  the  solution  of  a  map  problem  or 
terrain  exercise,  the  student  has  an  opportunity  to 
show  that  he  has  arrived  at  his  measures  by  logical 
sequence  of  thought.  As  Littzman  says:  "Only 
in  this  way  does  the  best  solution  attain  its  full  value, 
while  a  poorer  solution  can,  if  reasonably  deduced,  at 
least  claim  a  lenient  judgment.    Finally,  it  is  not  at 


-i8- 

all  impossible  that  the  one  who  constructed  the  prob- 
lem will  be  converted  to  a  different  opinion  by  a  well- 
grounded  solution.  After  ail,  in  tactical  affairs, 
nothing  can  be  laid  down  as  absolutely  correct  and 
no  author  of  problems  can  consider  himself  infal- 
lible." 

The  following  suggestions  may,  with  advantage, 
be  observed  in  writing  out  an  estimate  of  the  situ- 
ation: 

Your  mission  should  always  be  clearly  stated  at 
the  beginning  of  the  estimate. 

The  enemy,  your  own  troops  and  the  terrain  should 
then  be  discussed  in  whatever  manner  and  sequence 
appears  most  logical. 

By  discussing  them  in  sequence,  you  may  per- 
haps find  it  easier  to  avoid  failing  to  give  due  consid- 
eration to  each  element.  Generally,  however,  it  will 
be  found  difficult  to  discuss  each  of  them  entirely  by 
itself  without  rendering  your  discussion  less  logical. 
This  is  especially  true  of  the  terrain,  for  some  of  its 
features  may  affect  only  the  enemy's  movements 
while  others  may  be  of  importance  only  to  your  own 
troops.  Remember  that  the  main  thing  is  to  discuss 
in  a  logical  way  all  the  factors  that  affect  the  particu- 
lar situation. 

Do  not  waste  time  in  discussing  features  of  the 
terrain  that  can  in  no  way  affect  the  solution  of  the 
problem,  and  do  not  forget  that  in  most  cases  the 
elements  of  time  and  space  deserve  full  considera- 
tion. 

Having  considered  the  various  elements  men- 
tioned above,  the  next  thixg  to  do  is  to  discuss  such 
plans  of  action  as  are  open  for  selection  and  to  com- 
pare their  respective  advantages  and  disadvantages. 
Make  sure  that  you  have  not  neglected  to  consider 
the  various  available  methods  or  accomplishing  your 
mission.      Frequently  solutions  are  faulty  through 


—19— 

failure  to  consider  a  plan  of  action  obviously  prefer- 
able to  the  one  adopted. 

Your  decision  should  de  expressed  in  clear  and 
unmistakable  terms  as  the  conclusion  of  your  estimate. 
In  some  cases  your  decision  may  actually  be  formed 
piecemeal  during  the  course  of  the  estimate.  For 
example,  your  mission  may  be  such  as  to  make  it 
necessary  for  you  to  defeat  or  check  the  enemy. 
Your  consideration  of  the  enemy's  superior  strength 
causes  you  to  decide  to  act  on  the  defensive.  Other 
considerations  cause  you  to  decide  to  take  up  a  defen- 
sive position  without  delay.  Your  consideration  of 
the  terrain  causes  you  to  decide  to  take  up  your  posi- 
tion at  a  certain  place.  The  small  size  of  your  com- 
mand causes  you  to  occupy  a  certain  limited  amount 
of  frontage,  while  certain  other  considerations 
may  cause  you  to  decide  to  post  your  reserve  behind 
your  right  flank.  Even  if  your  decision  has  been 
logically  formed  in  some  such  manner  and  each  step 
has  been  indicated,  nevertheless  you  should  definite- 
ly conclude  your  estimate  by  stating  your  decision  in 
its  entirety. 


PART  III. 

Field  Orders 

"It  is  not  only  the  commander's  will  which  is  de- 
cisive in  war,  but  also  his  manner  of  expressing  that 
will.  The  order  which  is  to  transform  decision  into 
action  is  of  the  utmost  importance.  The  art  of  com- 
manding is  exceptionally  difficult,  but  is  indispensable 
for  a  leader  of  troops.  A  plan,  promising  success, 
may  fail  if  it  does  not  find  correct  expression  in  an 
order.  Often  a  faulty  expression,  a  word  too  much 
or  too  little,  or  an  omission,  may  become  the  source 
of  serious  consequences. 

"In  general,  however,  it  must  be  said  that  the 
ability  to  give  orders  goes  hand  in  hand  with  tactical 
knowledge.  Whoever  has  arrived  at  a  definite  and 
sure  decision  will  be  able  to  give  clear  and  decisive 
orders."* 

FORMAL  ORDERS 

Our  proposed  Field  Service  Regulations  contain 
a  number  of  rules  upon  the  composition  of  field  orders, 
as  well  as  regulations  upon  the  form  of  such  orders. 
Certain  "general  forms"  of  field  orders  are  given 
in  the  appendix  to  the  Regulations,  but  in  composing 
orders  it  must  be  remembered  that  these  forms  are 
only  guides  to  point  out  the  way  and  are  not  set  forms 
to  be  blindly  followed. 

Formal  orders  may  either  be  issued  in  writing  or 

may  be  dictated  by  a  commander  or  staff  officer  to 

the  subordinate  commanders  or  their  representatives. 

*Bu(idecke.     "Tactical  Decisions  and  Orders,"  page  47. 

20 


—31—      • 

The  written  form  is  "generally  used  when  commands 
are  scattered  or  are  as  large  as  a  division,"  although 
dictated  orders  are  frequently  made  use  of  at  division 
headquarters.  Commanders  of  units  smaller  than  a 
division  ordinarily  issue  verbal  or  dictated  orders,  ex- 
cept when  the  command  is  more  or  less  dispersed  or 
when  the  conditions  make  the  written  order  better 
adapted  to  the  situation. 

A  dictated  order  does  not  differ  in  appearance 
from  a  formal  written  order,  except  that  the  distri- 
bution of  troops  (if  used)  is  given  between  paragraphs 
2  and  3.  By  thus  placing  the  distribution  of  troops 
in  the  body  of  the  order  (instead  of  leaving  it  in  the 
margin)  the  one  to  whom  it  is  dictated  can  easily 
write  down  the  order  in  an  ordinary  note  book.  This 
arrangement  also  enables  the  recipient  to  understand 
better  the  tactical  dispositions  prescribed  in  para- 
graph 3.  When  a  written  field  order  is  sent  by  wire 
or  signals  the  distribution  of  trooos  is  given  in  the 
same  place  as  it  would  be  in  a  dictated  order— i.e., 
after  paragraph  2. 

VERBAL  ORDERS 

A  verbal  field  order  can  of  course  have  no  formal 
"heading"  or  "ending,"  nor  does  it  ordinarily  con- 
tain a  formal  statement  of  the  *  'distribution  of  troops. ' ' 
The  body  of  the  order,  should,  however,  be  practi- 
cally the  same  as  it  would  be  if  the  order  were  issued 
in  written  form.  In  other  words,  the  commander, 
in  issuing  a  verbal  order,  should  always  state,  first  of 
all,  the  information  of  the  enemy  and  of  his  own 
neighboring  or  supporting  troops;  he  should  next 
state  his  general  plan  of  action  or  so  much  of  it  as  is 
necessary  to  enable  his  subordinates  to  cooperate 
intelligently;  next  come  the  duties  of  the  various 
fractions  of  the  command;   finally,  the  commander 


—22— 

must  state  where  he  himself  can  be  found  or  where 
messages  will  reach  him. 

If  a  verbal  order  is  issued  by  the  commander  of 
a  newly  formed  detachment,  it  is  advisable  for  him 
to  state  the  composition  of  his  command  in  the  para- 
graph in  which  he  states  his  "general  plan  of  action." 
Similarly  in  the  paragraph  prescribing  '  'the  duties  of 
the  various  fractions  of  the  command"  it  is  ordinari- 
ly very  convenient  in  each  sub-paragraph  to  desig- 
nate the  troops  that  are  to  perform  the  particular 
duties. 

In  issuing  verbal  field  orders  on  the  ground,  and 
especially  if  no  maps  of  the  country  are  available,  it 
is  well  if  the  commander  can  assemble  his  principal 
sub-commanders  at  some  point  from  which  a  good 
view  of  the  terrain  can  be  obtained.  Then,  in  issu- 
ing his  orders,  he  can  point  out  the  various  places 
mentioned  therein. 

The  following  (imaginary)  verbal  outpost  order, 
which  we  will  assume  to  have  been  issued  by  Major 
A  to  his  company  commanders  and  Lieutenant  M  of 
the  cavalry,  may  serve  to  illustrate  the  remarks  in 
the  three  preceding  paragraphs: 

"The  enemy  has  withdrawn  toward  X,  the  town 
you  can  see  there  on  that  second  hill  about  three 
miles  north  of  here.  Our  main  body  has  halted  at  Y, 
the  village  that  lies  in  that  grove  of  trees  which  you 
see  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  south  of  here. 

*  'I  have  been  directed  to  establish  outposts  along 
Z  creek,  the  stream  here  just  to  the  north  of  us, 
with  my  battalion  and  a  platoon  of  Troop  A,  1st  Cav- 
alry. 

"The  cavalry  platoon,  under  Lieutenant  M,  will 
reconnoiter  toward         .....        etc. 

'  'Captain  A,  your  company  will  form  Support  No. 
1  and  will etc. 


—23- 

"Captain  B,  your  company  will  form  Support  No. 
2  and  will etc. 

"Companies  C  and  D  will  form  the  reserve  and 
will etc. 

"Our  battalion  field  train  will        .         .        etc. 

"I  shall  be  at 

When  verbal  orders  are  being  issued  by  the  com- 
mander, each  subordinate  present  should  jot  down 
such  notes  as  will  obviate  the  possibility  of  his  for- 
getting any  of  the  details  that  apply  to  his  own  par- 
ticular command.  Ordinarily  also,  a  staff  officer  of 
the  commander  will  at  the  same  time  take  down  suf- 
ficient notes  to  enable  him  to  make  a  memorandum 
of  the  principal  details  of  the  order. 

After  having  issued  verbal  field  orders,  it  is 
usually  advisable  for  the  commander  to  state  that  in 
case  any  one  does  not  understand  his  orders  he  should 
say  so  in  order  that  the  matter  may  be  cleared  up  at 
once.  Any  officer  who  does  not  thoroughly  under- 
stand his  orders  should  of  course  have  no  hesitancy 
in  asking  that  they  be  repeated  or  explained.  If  a 
false  sense  of  pride  keeps  him  from  asking  for  such 
information  or  elucidation,  he  is  not  playing  fair 
either  to  himself  or  to  his  commander. 

In  the  outpost  situation  just  assumed,  Major  A 
would  doubtless,  after  issuing  his  orders,  send  back 
to  the  commander  of  the  main  body  a  short  message 
stating  his  principal  dispositions,  and  the  place  where 
messages  will  reach  him. 

COMPOSITION  OF  FIELD  ORDERS 

We  shall  now  briefly  consider  what  should  appear 
in  each  paragraph  of  the  body  of  an  ordinary  field 
order  and  what  should  be  omitted. 

1st  Paragraph.  {Information  of  the  Enemy 
and  of  our  Supporting  Troops.)  , 


—24— 

In  publishing  information  received  concerning 
the  enemy  it  is  well,  in  most  cases  where  the  infor 
mation  is  of  doubtful  reliability,  to  show  the  source 
of  the  information.  The  recipients  of  the  order  can 
then  judge  its  value  for  themselves,  and,  in  case  the 
information  proves  incorrect,  it  will  not  reflect  upon 
the  commanders  judgment.  For  instance,  one  might 
state  "According  to  reports  of  friendly  inhabitants" 
such  and  such  is  the  case;  or  "A  spy  reports"  such 
and  such;  or  else  the  statement  might  be  introduced 
by  the  words  "It  is  reported"  or  "It  is  believed" 
that  such  and  such  is  the  case.  When,  however,  the 
information  is  the  result  of  a  trained  officer's  personal 
observation  or  is  otherwise  known  to  be  reliable  and 
accurate,  the  commander  should  assume  the  respon- 
sibility of  stating  it  as  a  fact.  For  example,  instead 
of  saying  "A  number  of  reports  from  reliable  sources 
show  that  a  hostile  division  camped  near  Kickapoo 
last  night,"  the  commander  might  better  say  "A 
hostile  division  camped  near  Kickapoo  last  night," 

If  the  recipients  of  the  order  are  already  ac- 
quainted with  the  latest  information  concerning  the 
enemy,  the  commander  should  begin  his  order  by 
saying:  "No  further  news  of  the  enemy  has  been 
received"  or  something  to  that  effect.  Each  officer 
who  receives  the  order  will  then  understand  that  the 
order  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  enemy's 
situation  remains  the  same  as  before,  and  will  be 
able  to  act  more  intelligently  in  case  the  enemy's 
actions  prove  to  be  considerably  different  from  w^at 
was  believed  to  be  the  case  at  the  time  the  order 
was  issued. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  trustworthy  information  of 
the  enemy  has  been  received  since  the  subordinate 
officers  were  last  made  acquainted  with  the  situation, 
this  new  information  would  ordinarily  be  stated. 
Similarly,  with  reference  to  our  supporting  troops, 


—25— 

any  changes  of  importance  to  our  command  would 
ordinarily  be  mentioned. 

Occasions  often  arise  where  for  one  reason  or 
another  it  seems  inadvisable  to  give  out  all  that  is 
known  concerning  the  enemy  or  our  supporting 
troops.  A  good  example  of  such  an  occasion  may  be 
found  in  almost  any  retreat  after  an  unsuccessful  en- 
gagement. In  such  cases  it  is  usually  advisable  to 
.avoid  distributing  information  of  a  discouraging 
nature  unless  it  be  absolutely  necessary  to  do  so  in 
order  to  guard  against  surprise  or  further  reverses. 
The  troops,  under  such  circumstances,  are  already 
disheartened,  and  a  statement  of  all  the  conditions, 
even  if  given  verbally  and  only  to  officers,  may  result 
unfavorably  upon  the  already  shaken  morale  of  the 
command.  All  favorable  information,  however,  such 
as  reports  of  local  successes  on  our  side  or  the  ap- 
proach of  reinforcements  should  be  emphasized. 
Mis-statements  must,  however,  be  shunned,  for 
otherwise  both  officers  and  men  will  lose  confidence 
in  their  commander,  and  once  he  loses  their  confi- 
dence, his  value  as  a  leader  ceases. 

2d  Paragraph.  {Plan  of  commander.) 
In  this  paragraph,  the  commander's  plan  must  be 
outlined  sufficiently  to  ensure  the  necessary  coopera- 
tion of  all  parts  of  his  command,  the  extent  to  which 
it  is  outlined  depending  upon  the  circumstances  of 
the  particular  situation.  In  the  case  of  a  march 
made  with  a  view  to  seizing  some  particular  point 
several  days'  march  distant,  it  would  be  very  unwise 
to  state  the  object  of  the  movement  before  it  is  with- 
in reach.  In  such  a  case  the  second  paragraph  of 
the  march  order  of  each  of  the  first  few  days  would 
ordinarily  merely  state  "This  command  will  march 
today  towards"  such  town  or  other  geographical 
point,  naming  in  each  case  some  objective  not  more 


-26— 

than  a  good  day's  march  distant.  Thus  not  until  the 
real  objective  is  within  reach  would  the  real  purpose 
of  the  movement  become  known  to  all— and  yet  each 
day  the  various  subordinates  would  know  all  that 
was  necessary  for  them  to  know  on  that  particular 
day. 

The  importance  of  a  commander  giving  out 
enough  of  his  plan  to  ensure  team  work  on  the  part  of 
all  elements  of  his  command  cannot  be  over-estimated. 
For  example,  in  a  defensive  action  it  is  important 
that  the  subordinate  commanders  be  informed  as  to 
whether  a  "fight  to  a  decision"  is  to  be  made  or 
whether  only  a  delaying  action  is  to  be  fought,  while 
in  an  attack  it  is  equally  necessary  for  the  comman- 
der's general  plan  to  be  understood  by  all  concerned. 

3d  Paragraph.  {Detailed  Tactical  Disposi- 
tions.) 

Much  latitude  must  of  necessity  be  permitted  a 
commander  in  framing  this  part  of  his  order.  He 
must  be  sufficiently  specific  in  regard  to  the  respec- 
tive duties  of  the  various  features  of  the  command 
to  ensure  a  thorough  understanding  of  the  relation 
that  each  part  bears  to  the  whole  and  to  the  other 
parts,  and  yet  he  must  not  rob  his  subordinates  of 
their  proper  degree  of  initiative.  Upon  the  wording 
of  this  paragraph  (and  the  preceding  one  in  which  he 
outlines  his  general  plan)  largely  depends  the  co- 
operation of  the  various  sub-divisions.  Imagine,  for 
instance,  a  football  team  in  which,  at  the  crisis  of 
the  game,  the  signals  given  by  the  team  captain  were 
not  clearly  given,  or  were  misunderstood  by  the 
other  players.  You  can  readily  picture  the  effect 
upon  the  result  of  the  game,  even  though  the  indi- 
vidual players  were  stronger  and  heavier  than  their 
opponents.  Although  Napoleon  said  that  the  Lord 
was  on  the  side  of  the  heaviest  battalions,  he  did  not 


-2f- 

mean  that  mere  numbers  were  the  deciding  factor^ 
but  rather  that  getting  the  heaviest  battalions  to  the 
right  place  at  the  right  time  was  what  counted.  Co- 
operation and  team  work  count  just  as  much  in  war 
as  in  football. 

In  composing  the  sub-paragraphs  of  this  section 
of  the  order,  a  commander  should  utilize  his  knowl- 
edge of  the  character  of  his  subordinate  commanders. 
As  Buddecke  says:  "The  order  must  define  exactly 
if  the  one  who  is  to  carry  it  out  is  of  an  over-adven- 
turous nature;  it  may  leave  a  larger  discretion  to  a 
subordinate  who  may  be  expected  to  find  the  right 
way  himself.  The  order  speaks  a  very  positive 
language  when  it  is  a  question  of  urging  on  or  of 
emphasizing  responsibility;  it  needs  only  to  hint  if 
the  exercise  of  proper  initiative  by  the  subordinate 
may  be  depended  upon."  Moreover,  care  must  be 
taken  to  adapt  the  order  to  the  intellectual  horizon 
and  military  ability  of  the  one  who  is  to  carry  it  out. 

For  instance,  let  us  assume  that  in  time  of  war 
and  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy  Major  A  is  detailed 
to  form  an  outpost  with  his  battalion.  Let  us  further 
assume  that  two  of  his  companies  are  to  be  placed  on 
duty  as  supports,  the  other  two  being  held  in  reserve, 
and  that  Companies  A  and  B  are  the  ones  detailed 
for  duty  as  supports.  Company  A  is  commanded  by 
Captain  A,  an  experienced  oflficer  of  recognized 
ability,  while  Company  B  is  temporarily  commanded 
by  2d  Lieutenant  B,  a  young  officer  of  little  experi- 
ence. 

Assuming  that  Major  A  issues  his  orders  to  both 
support  commanders  at  the  same  time,  he  would 
(after  giving  the  preliminary  information  of  the  ene- 
my, of  supporting  troops  and  of  the  fact  that  the 
battalion  was  detailed  for  outpost)  simply  say  to  Cap- 
tain A  something  like  this:  *  'Captain,  your  company 
will  form  Support  No.  1,  taking  position  near  that 


hill  and  observing  the  front  from  this  road  (exclusivfe) 
to  that  farm  house."  While  to  Lieutenant  B  he 
might  say:  "Lieutenant  B,  your  company  will  form 
Support  No.  2  and  will  be  posted  on  the  southern 
edge  of  that  orchard.  You  will  be  responsible  for 
the  front  from  this  road  (inclusive)  to  that  stream. 
It  will  probably  be  necessary  during  daylight  to  have 
two  sentry  squads  out  in  front,  one  at  the  bridge  and 
the  other  at  the  railroad  station.  Send  a  patrol  of  a 
squad  or  so  a  half  mile  west  of  the  bridge.  Concern- 
ing your  night  positions  I  shall  give  you  further  in- 
structions when  I  visit  your  support."  (The  other 
information  necessary,  i.  e.  the,  location  of  the  re- 
serve and  the  place  where  he  himself  can  be  found, 
would  then  of  course  be  given  both  officers). 

'  The  illustration  just  given  shows  how,  at  a  time 
when  a  mistake  on  the  part  of  a  subordinate  may 
prove  costly,  a  commander  must  adapt  his  orders  to 
the  ability  of  the  recipient.  Captain  A  needed  no  de- 
tailed instructions  concerning  the  manner  in  which 
he  should  perform  his  outpost  duty,  and  Major  A  was 
perfectly  right  in  not  interfering  with  his  preroga- 
tives as  a  skillful  commander.  On  the  other  hand. 
Major  A  was  not  sure  that  Lieutenant  B  would  prove 
equal  to  the  occasion — and  so  was  equally  right  in  go- 
ing more  into  details  in  the  orders  to  him. 

On  the  other  hand,  had  the  above  described  situ- 
ation arisen  duringatacticalexercisein  time  of  peace, 
Major  A  would  not  have  given  Lieutenant  B  such  de- 
tailed instructions,  but  would  have  made  him  depend 
more  upon  his  own  j  udgment.  To  quote  from  Gizy cki : 
"During  tactical  exercises  in  time  of  peace  the  su- 
perior issues  short  orders  and  instructions  and  leaves 
the  execution  of  the  same  as  far  as  possible  to  his 
subordinates.  For  the  superior  then  wishes  to  be- 
come acquainted  with  the  ability  and  judgment  of 
his  subordinates.     If  errors  are  made  by  the  latter 


--2b- 

they  do  not  result  in  injury  to  the  troops,  but  serve 
as  a  means  of  instruction  and  further  advancement. 
War  is  not  the  place  for  this.  In  war  it  is  neces- 
sary to  dispose  of  the  available  strength  and  ability 
in  such  a  way  as  to  derive  the  greatest  benefit." 

4th  Paragraph.  {Orders  for  Sanitary  Troops  ^ 
Traitis,  etc.) 

This  paragraph  is  sometimes  unnecessary  in  very 
small  commands,  but  in  large  commands  the  trains 
always  demand  a  considerable  part  of  the  comman- 
der's attention.  Especially  is  this  the  case  with  a 
strong  force  marching  through  hostile  country  and 
largely  dependent  upon  its  supply  trains  for  its  sub- 
sistence and  upon  its  ammunition  columns  for  the 
replenishment  of  its  ammunition.  In  the  handling  of 
trains,  as  in  the  handling  of  troops,  each  situation 
must  be  judged  upon  its  own  merits  and  the  disposi- 
tion of  the  trains  must  be  made  to  accord  with  the 
circumstances  of  the  particular  case. 

5th  Paragraph.     {Place  of  Commander.) 

Generally  speaking,  the  body  of  a  field  order 
is  incomplete  unless  it  terminates  with  a  statement 
as  to  where  the  commander  can  be  found  or  where 
messages  will  reach  him.  (If,  later  on,  the  comman- 
der has  reasons  to  go  elsewhere,  he  should  leave  at 
the  point  designated  in  the  order,  a  staff  officer  who 
knows  his  whereabouts.)  Although  the  importance 
of  this  paragraph  is  self-evident,  yet  not  infrequently, 
both  at  maneuvers  and  in  war,  information  as  to  the 
"place  of  the  commander"  is  inadvertently  omitted— 
often  with  grave  results. 

WRITING  OUT  ORDERS  CALLED  FOR  IN  MAP  PROBLEMS 

In  writing  out  orders  called  for  as  one  of  the  re- 
quirements of  a  map  problem,  the  following  hints 
may  be  of  assistance: 

In  deciding  into  how  great  detail  you  should  go 


-S6- 

m  your  orders,  it  is  well  to  remember  that  all  your 
(imaginary)  subordinates  are  considered  to  be  well- 
trained  officers.  By  remembering-  this  you  will  avoid 
giving  detailed  instructions  on  points  which  such  sub- 
ordinates should  be  allowed  to  determine  for  them- 
selves. Do  not  usurp  their  rights  as  sub-com- 
manders. 

Confine  your  orders  to  the  measures  necessary  to 
cover  the  particular  situation  presented  in  the  prob- 
lem. You  will  thus  avoid  the  common  fault  of  issu- 
ing orders  that  reach  too  far  into  the  future. 

In  composing  orders,  whether  written  or  verbal, 
it  is  generally  advisable  to  follow  the  ordinary  se- 
quence of  paragraphs  prescribed  for  formal  orders. 

Whether  written,  dictated  or  verbal  orders  should 
be  issued,  will  depend  upon  circumstances.  Deter- 
mine for  yourself  in  what  form  you  would  actually 
issue  the  orders  if  the  situation  were  real  and  you 
were  actually  in  command  of  the  troops  on  the  ground. 
Then  issue  the  orders  in  that  form.  Remember  that 
in  writing  out  verbal  orders,  the  orders  must  be 
quoted  verbatim  and  should  be  introduced  by  a  state- 
ment showing  the  time  and  pla^e  of  issue  as  well  as 
to  whom  issued. 


"There  is  no  greater  mistake,  either  in  tactics 
or  in  the  manner  of  drawing  up  orders,  than  a  blind 
adherence  to  set  forms.  Every  case  is  different. 
Every  case  must  be  judged  and  handled  by  itself." 


626:>4 


K.  ■:.-^. 


